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Abstract
Natural images are virtually surrounded by low-density misclassified regions that
can be efficiently discovered by gradient-guided search — enabling the generation
of adversarial images. While many techniques for detecting these attacks have
been proposed, they are easily bypassed when the adversary has full knowledge
of the detection mechanism and adapts the attack strategy accordingly. In this
paper, we adopt a novel perspective and regard the omnipresence of adversarial
perturbations as a strength rather than a weakness. We postulate that if an image
has been tampered with, these adversarial directions either become harder to find
with gradient methods or have substantially higher density than for natural images.
We develop a practical test for this signature characteristic to successfully detect
adversarial attacks, achieving unprecedented accuracy under the white-box setting
where the adversary is given full knowledge of our detection mechanism.
1 Introduction
The advance of deep neural networks has led to natural questions regarding its robustness to both
natural and malicious change in the test input. For the latter scenario, the seminal work of Biggio et
al. [3] and Szegedy et al. [49] first suggested that neural networks may be prone to imperceptible
changes in the input — the so-called adversarial perturbations — that alter the model’s decision
entirely. This weakness not only applies to image classification models, but is prevalent in various
machine learning applications, including object detection and image segmentation [10, 55], speech
recognition [8], and deep policy networks [2, 22].
The threat of adversarial perturbations has prompted tremendous effort towards the development
of defense mechanisms. Common defenses either attempt to recover the true semantic labels of
the input [5, 12, 20, 39, 42, 46] or detect and reject adversarial examples [18, 29, 32, 34–36, 56].
Although many of the proposed defenses have been successful against passive attackers — ones that
are unaware of the presence of the defense mechanism — almost all fail against adversaries that have
full knowledge of the internal details of the defense and modify the attack algorithm accordingly
[1, 6]. To date, the success of existing defenses have been limited to simple datasets with relatively
low variety of classes [25, 30, 40, 45, 53].
Recent studies [13, 43] have shown that the existence of adversarial perturbations may be an inherent
property of natural data distributions in high dimensional spaces — painting a grim picture for
defenses. However, in this paper we propose a radically new approach to defenses against adversarial
attacks that turns this seemingly insurmountable obstacle from a weakness into a strength: We use
the inherent property of the existence of valid adversarial perturbations around a natural image as a
signature to attest that it is unperturbed.
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Concretely, we exploit two seemingly contradicting properties of natural images: On one hand,
natural images lie with high probability near the decision boundary to any given label [13, 43]; on the
other hand, natural images are robust to random noise [49], which means these small “pockets” of
spaces where the input is misclassified have low density and are unlikely to be found through random
perturbations. To verify if an image is benign, we can test for both properties effectively:
1. We measure the degree of robustness to random noise by observing the change in prediction after
adding i.i.d. Gaussian noise.
2. We measure the proximity to a decision boundary by observing the number of gradient steps
required to change the label of an input image. This procedure is identical to running a gradient-based
attack algorithm against the input (which is potentially an adversarial image already).
We hypothesize that artificially perturbed images mostly violate at least one of the two conditions.
This gives rise to an effective detection mechanism even when the adversary has full knowledge of
the defense. Against strong L∞-bounded white-box adversaries that adaptively optimize against
the detector, we achieve a worst-case detection rate of 49% at a false positive rate of 20% on
ImageNet [11] using a pre-trained ResNet-101 model [21]. Prior art achieves a detection rate of
0% at equal false positive rate under the same setting. Further analysis shows that there exists a
fundamental trade-off for white-box attackers when optimizing to satisfy the two detection criteria.
Our method creates new challenges for the search of adversarial examples and points to a promising
direction for future research in defense against white-box adversaries.
2 Background
Attack overview. Test-time attacks via adversarial examples can be broadly categorized into either
black-box or white-box settings. In the black-box setting, the adversary can only access the model
as an oracle, and may receive continuous-valued outputs or only discrete classification decisions
[9, 19, 23, 24, 31, 38, 50–52]. We focus on the white-box setting in this paper, where the attacker
is assumed to be an insider and therefore has full knowledge of internal details of the network. In
particular, having access to the model parameters allows the attacker to perform powerful first-order
optimization attacks by optimizing an adversarial loss function.
The white-box attack framework can be summarized as follows. Let h be the target classification
model that, given any input x, outputs a vector of probabilities h(x) with h(x)y′ = p(y′|x) (i.e.
the y′-th component of the vector h(x)) for every class y′. Let y be the true class of x and L be a
continuous-valued adversarial loss that encourages misclassification, e.g.,
L(h(x′), y) = −cross-entropy(h(x′), y).
Given a target image x for which the model correctly classifies as arg maxy′ h(x)y′ = y, the attacker
aims to solve the following optimization problem:
min
x′
L(h(x′), y) , s.t. ‖x− x′‖ ≤ τ.
Here, ‖ · ‖ is a measure of perceptible difference and is commonly approximated using the Euclidean
norm ‖·‖2 or the max-norm ‖·‖∞, and τ > 0 is a perceptibility threshold. This optimization problem
defines an untargeted attack, where the adversary’s goal is to cause misclassification. In contrast, for
a targeted attack, the adversary is given some target label yt 6= y and defines the adversarial loss to
encourage classification to the target label:
L(h(x′), yt) = cross-entropy(h(x′), yt). (1)
For the remainder of this paper, we will focus on the targeted attack setting but any approach can be
readily augmented for untargeted attacks as well.
Optimization. White-box (targeted) attacks mainly differ in the choice of the adversarial loss
functions L and the optimization procedures. One of the earliest attacks [49] used L-BFGS to
optimize the cross-entropy adversarial loss in Equation 1. Carlini and Wagner [7] investigated the use
of different adversarial loss functions and found that the margin loss
L(Z(x′), yt) =
[
max
y′ 6=yt
Z(x′)y′ − Z(x′)yt + κ
]
+
(2)
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is more suitable for first-order optimization methods, where Z is the logit vector predicted by the
model and κ > 0 is a chosen margin constant. This loss is optimized using Adam [26], and the
resulting method is known as the Carlini-Wagner (CW) attack. Another class of attacks favors the
use of simple gradient descent using the sign of the gradient [17, 28, 33], which results in improved
transferability of the constructed adversarial examples from one classification model to another.
Enforcing perceptibility constraint. For common choices of the measures of perceptibility, the
attacker can either fold the constraint as a Lagrangian penalty into the adversarial loss, or apply a
projection step at the end of every iteration onto the feasible region. Since the Euclidean norm ‖ · ‖2
is differentiable, it is commonly enforced with the former option, i.e.,
min
x′
L(h(x′), yt) + c‖x− x′‖2
for some choice of c > 0. On the other hand, the max-norm ‖ · ‖∞ is often enforced by restricting
every coordinate of the difference x− x′ to the range [−τ, τ ] after every gradient step. In addition,
since all pixel values must fall within the range [0, 1], most methods also project x′ to the unit cube at
the end of every iteration [7, 33]. When using this option along with the cross entropy adversarial loss,
the resulting algorithm is commonly referred to as the Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) attack1 [1].
3 Detection Methods and Their Insufficiency
One commonly accepted explanation for the existence of adversarial examples is that they operate
outside the natural image manifold — regions of the space that the model had no exposure to during
training time and hence its behavior can be manipulated arbitrarily. This view casts the problem of
defending against adversarial examples as a robust classification or anomaly detection problem. The
former aims to project the input back to the natural image manifold and recover its true label, whereas
the latter only requires determining whether the input belongs to the manifold and reject it if not.
Detection methods. Many principled detection algorithms have been proposed to date [18, 29, 32, 34–
36, 56]. The most common approach involves testing the input against one or several criteria that are
satisfied by natural images but are likely to fail for adversarially perturbed images. In what follows,
we briefly describe two representative detection mechanisms.
Feature Squeezing [56] applies a semantic-preserving image transformation to the input and measures
the difference in the model’s prediction compared to the plain input. Transformations such as median
smoothing, bit quantization, and non-local mean do not alter the image content; hence the model
is expected to output similar predictions after applying these transformations. The method then
measures the maximum L1 change in predicted probability after applying these transformations and
flags the input as adversarial if this change is above a chosen threshold.
Artifacts [14] uses the empirical density of the input and the model uncertainty to characterize benign
and adversarial images. The empirical density can be computed via kernel density estimation on
the feature vector. For the uncertainty estimate, the method evaluates the network multiple times
using different random dropout masks and computes the variance in the output. Under the Bayesian
interpretation of dropout, this variance estimate encodes the model’s uncertainty [16]. Adversarial
inputs are expected to have lower density and higher uncertainty than natural inputs. Thus, the method
predicts the input as adversarial if these criteria are below or above a chosen threshold.
Detectors that use multiple criteria (such as Feature Squeezing and Artifacts) can combine these
criteria into a single detection method by either declaring the input as adversarial if any criterion
fails to be satisfied, or by training a classifier on top of them as features to classify the input. Other
notable useful features for detecting adversarial images include convolutional features extracted from
intermediate layers [29, 35], distance to training samples in pixel space [18, 32], and entropy of
non-maximal class probabilities [37].
Bypassing detection methods. While the approaches for detecting adversarial examples appear
principled in nature, the difference in settings from traditional anomaly detection renders most
techniques easy to bypass. In essence, a white-box adversary with knowledge of the features used for
detection can optimize the adversarial input to mimic these features with gradient descent. Any non-
differentiable component used in the detection algorithm, such as bit quantization and non-local mean,
1Some literature also refer to the iterative Fast Gradient Signed Method (FGSM) [17] as PGD [33].
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can be approximated with the identity transformation on the backward pass [1], and randomization
can be circumvented by minimizing the expected adversarial loss via Monte Carlo sampling [1].
These simple techniques have proven tremendously successful, bypassing almost all known detection
methods to date [6]. Given enough gradient queries, adversarial examples can be optimized to appear
even “more benign” than natural images.
4 Detection by Adversarial Perturbations
In this section we describe a novel approach to detect adversarial images that relies on two principled
criteria regarding the distribution of adversarial perturbations around natural images. In contrast to
the shortcomings of prior work, our approach is hard to fool through first-order optimization.
4.1 Criterion 1: Low density of adversarial perturbations
The features extracted by convolutional neural networks (CNNs) from natural images are known to
be particularly robust to random input corruptions [20, 49, 54]. In other words, random perturbations
applied to natural images should not lead to changes in the predicted label (i.e. an adversarial image).
Our first criterion follows this intuition and tests if the given input is robust to Gaussian noise:
C1: Robustness to random noise. Sample  ∼ N(0, σ2I) (where σ2 is a hyperparameter) and
compute ∆ = ‖h(x)− h(x + )‖1. The input x is rejected as adversarial if ∆ is sufficiently large.
x
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Figure 1: Schematic illustra-
tion of the shape of adversarial
regions near a natural image x.
This style of reasoning has indeed been successfully applied to de-
fend against black-box and gray-box2 attacks [20, 41, 54]. Figure 1
shows a 2D cartoon depiction of the high dimensional decision
boundary near a natural image x. When the adversarial attack per-
turbs x slightly across the decision boundary from A to an incorrect
class B, the resulting adversarial image x′ can be easily randomly
perturbed to return to class A and will therefore fail criterion C1.
However, we emphasize that this criterion alone is insufficient
against white-box adversaries and can be easily bypassed. In or-
der to make the adversarial image also robust against Gaussian noise,
the attacker can optimize the expected adversarial loss under this
defense strategy [1] through Monte Carlo sampling of noise vectors
during optimization. This effectively produces an adversarial image
x′′ (see Figure 1) that is deep inside the decision boundary.
More precisely, for a natural image x with correctly predicted label y and target label yt, let h(x) be
the predicted class-probability vector. Let us define padv to be identical to h(x) in every dimension,
except for the correct class y and the target yt, where the two probabilities are swapped. Consequently,
dimension yt is the dominant prediction in padv. We redefine the adversarial loss of the (targeted)
PGD attack to contain two terms:
L? = L1 + L2 where: L1 = L(h(x′),padv)︸ ︷︷ ︸
misclassify x′ as yt
, and L2 = E∼N(0,σ2I) [‖h(x′)− h(x′ + )‖1]︸ ︷︷ ︸
bypass C1
, (3)
where L(·, ·) denotes the cross-entropy loss. For the first term, we deviate from standard attacks
by targeting the probability vector padv instead of the one-hot vector corresponding to label yt.
Optimizing against the one-hot vector would cause the adversarial example to over-saturate in
probability, which artificially increases the difference ∆ = ‖h(x′)− h(x′ + )‖1 and makes it easier
to detect using criterion C1.
We evaluate this white-box attack against criterion C1 using a pre-trained ResNet-101 [21] model on
ImageNet [11] as the classification model. We sample 1,000 images from the ImageNet validation
set and optimize the adversarial loss L? for each of them using Adam [26] with learning rate 0.005
for a maximum of 400 steps to construct the adversarial images.
Figure 2 (left) shows the effect of the number of gradient iterations on ∆ when optimizing the
adversarial loss L?. The center line shows median values of ∆ across 1,000 sample images, and
2In gray-box attacks, the adversary has full access to the classifier h but is agnostic to the defense mechanism.
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Figure 2: The variation in ∆ under Gaussian perturbations (C1; left plot) and numbers of steps Kt to
the decision boundary (C2t; right plot) for adversarial images constructed using different numbers of
gradient iterations. Gray-box attacks (orange) can be detected easily with criterion C1 alone (left
plot, the orange line is significantly higher than the gray line). For white-box attacks (blue), C1 alone
is not sufficient (the blue line overlaps with the gray line) — however C2 (right plot) separates the
two lines reliably when C1 does not.
the error bars show the range of values between the 30th and 70th quantiles. When the attacker
is agnostic to the detector (orange line), i.e., only optimizing L1, ∆ does not decrease throughout
optimization and can be used to perfectly separate adversarial and real images (gray line). However,
in the white-box attack, the adversarial loss explicitly encourages ∆ to be small, and we observe that
indeed the blue line shows a downward trend as the adversary proceeds through gradient iterations.
As a result, the range of values for ∆ quickly begins to overlap with and fall below that of real images
after 100 steps, which shows that criterion C1 alone cannot be used to detect adversarial examples.
4.2 Criterion 2: Close proximity to decision boundary
The intuitive reason why the attack strategy described above in section 4.1 can successfully fool
criterion C1 is that it effectively pushes the adversarial image far into the decision boundary of the
target class (e.g. x′′ in Figure 1) — an unlikely position for a natural image, which tends to be close
to adversarial decision boundaries. Indeed, Fawzi et al. [13] and Shafahi et al. [43] have shown that
adversarial examples are inevitable in high-dimensional spaces. Their theoretical arguments suggest
that, due to the curse of dimensionality, a sample from the natural image distribution is close to the
decision boundary of any classifier with high probability. Hence, we define a second criterion to test
if an image is close to the decision boundary of an incorrect class:
C2(t/u): Susceptibility to adversarial noise. For a chosen first-order iterative attack algorithm A,
evaluate A on the input x and record the minimum number of steps K required to adversarially
perturb x. The input is rejected as adversarial if K is sufficiently large.
Criterion C2 can be further specialized to targeted attacks (C2t) and untargeted attacks (C2u), which
measures the proximity (i.e. number of gradient steps) to either a chosen target class or to an arbitrary
but different class. We denote these quantities as Kt and Ku, respectively. In this paper we choose A
in C2 to be the targeted/untargeted PGD attack, but our framework can plausibly generalize to any
first-order attack algorithm. Figure 2 (right) shows the effect of optimizing the adversarial loss L?
on Kt. Again, the center line shows the median value of Kt across 1,000 images and the error bars
indicate the 30th and 70th quantiles. As expected, real images (gray line) require very few steps to
reach the decision boundary of any random target class. When the adversary does not seek to bypass
criterion C1 (orange line), the constructed adversarial images lie very close to the decision boundary
and are indistinguishable from real images with C2 alone (however here C1 is already sufficient).
On the other hand, when the attacker minimizes ∆ to fool criterion C1, the adversarial image moves
away from the decision boundary in order to be robust to random Gaussian noise. This results in
an increase in the number of steps Kt to reach the decision boundary of a random target class. At
400 steps, there is almost no overlap between the 30-70th quantiles of values of Kt for real and
adversarial images. This separation begins almost precisely as the value of ∆ for adversarial images
(left plot) begins to overlap with that of natural images at 100 steps. Thus, C2t becomes an effective
criterion to detect adversarial images that optimize against C1.
5
4.3 Detection strategy
The fact that natural images can simultaneously satisfy criteria C1 and C2 can be regarded as almost
paradoxical: While the minimum distance from a natural input to the decision boundary of any
incorrect class is small, the density of directions that can lead to a decision boundary within a short
distance is also very low. We postulate that this behavior of natural images is difficult to imitate even
for an adaptive, white-box adversary.
Our detection strategy using the two criteria can be summarized as follows. Given an input x (which
might be an adversarial example already), we compute (∆,Kt,Ku) and compare these quantities
to chosen thresholds (tC1, tC2t, tC2u), corresponding to criteria C1, C2t, and C2u. We reject x as an
adversarial example if at least one of the three (sub-)criteria is not satisfied, i.e., if any measurement
is larger than the corresponding threshold. Details on hyperparameter selection can be found in the
Supplementary Material.
Best effort white-box adversary. Based on our proposed detection method, we define a white-box
adversary that aims to cause misclassification while passing the detection criteria C1 and C2. Let
L be the adversarial loss for the defense-agnostic (targeted) attack (e.g. Equation 1). We define
loss functions L1 and L2 as in Equation 3 following the same strategy used in section 4.1 to bypass
C1. Since the criterion C2t is discrete, it is difficult to optimize directly. Instead, we encourage the
constructed adversarial image to change prediction to any class y′ 6= yt after a single gradient step
towards y′. As natural images require very few gradient steps to cross the decision boundary, the
resulting adversarial image will appear real to criterion C2t. Let
δy′ = ∇x′LA(h(x′), y′)
denote the gradient of the cross-entropy loss w.r.t. x′3. The loss term to bypass C2t can be defined as
L3 = Ey′∼Uniform,y′ 6=yt [L(h(x′ − αδy′), y′)],
which encourages x′ − αδy′ — the one-step move towards class y′ at step size α — to be close to or
cross the decision boundary of class y′ for every randomly chosen class y′ 6= yt. Similarly, to bypass
criterion C2u, we simulate one gradient step at step size α away from the target class yt (which the
defender perceives as the predicted class) as x′ + αδyt . We then encourage this resulting image to be
classified as not yt via the loss term:
L4 = −L(h(x′ + αδyt), yt).
Gradients for L3 and L4 can be approximated using Backward Pass Differentiable Approximation
(BPDA) [1]. As a result of optimizing L3 and L4, the produced image x′ will admit both a targeted
and an untargeted “adversarial example” within one or few steps of the attack algorithm A, therefore
bypassing C2. Combining all the components, the modified adversarial loss L? for white-box attack
against our detector becomes
L? = λL1 + L2 + L3 + L4. (4)
The inclusion of additional loss terms hinders the optimality of L1 and may cause the attack to fail to
generate a valid adversarial example. Thus, we include the coefficient λ so that L1 dominates the
other loss terms and guarantees close to 100% success rate in constructing adversarial examples to
fool h. We optimize the total loss L? using Adam [26].
5 Experiments
We test our detection mechanism against the white-box attack defined in section 4.3 in several
different settings, and release our code publicly for reproducibility4.
5.1 Setup
Datasets and target models. We conduct our empirical studies on ImageNet [11] and CIFAR-10 [27].
We sample 1,000 images from ImageNet (validation) and CIFAR-10 (test): each class has 1 or 100
images. We use the pre-trained ResNet-101 model [21] in PyTorch for ImageNet and train a VGG-19
model [44] with a dropout rate of 0.5 [47] for CIFAR-10 as target models. We additionally include
detection results using an Inception-v3 model [48] on ImageNet in the Supplementary Material.
3We denote the adversarial loss of the Algo. A in our detector by LA to differentiate it from L of the attacker.
4https://github.com/s-huu/TurningWeaknessIntoStrength
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Table 1: Detection rates of different detection algorithms against white-box adversaries on ImageNet.
Worst-case performance against all evaluated attacks is underlined for each detector.
Detector FPR PGD CW
Feature Squeezing 0.2 0.003 0.000
Feature Squeezing 0.1 0.002 0.000
LR=0.01 LR=0.03 LR=0.1 LR=0.01 LR=0.03 LR=0.1
C1 0.2 0.585 0.132 0.066 0.682 0.103 0.068
C2t 0.2 0.205 0.649 0.724 0.436 0.800 0.882
C2u 0.2 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.154 0.042 0.039
Combined 0.2 0.494 0.490 0.612 0.688 0.718 0.809
C1 0.1 0.320 0.043 0.013 0.486 0.044 0.021
C2t 0.1 0.120 0.483 0.616 0.287 0.709 0.806
C2u 0.1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.062 0.010 0.003
Combined 0.1 0.269 0.264 0.378 0.512 0.482 0.601
Figure 3: A sample clean (left) and ad-
versarial (right) image at L∞ percepti-
bility threshold of τ = 0.1.
Attack algorithms. We evaluate our detection method
against the white-box adversary defined in section 4.3.
Since the adversary may vary in the choice of the surrogate
loss (cf. L in Equation 3), we experiment using both
targeted and untargeted variants of two representative loss
functions: the margin loss defined in the Carlini-Wagner
(CW) attack [7] (see Equation 2), and the cross-entropy
loss used in the Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) attack
[1]. The L∞-bound for all attacks is set to τ = 0.1, which
is very strong and often produces images with noticeable
visual distortion. See Figure 3 for an illustration. We
further experiment with boundary attack [4] for attacking
the target model and detection mechanism as a black box in the Supplementary Material.
All attacks optimize the adversarial loss using Adam [26]. We set λ = 2 (cf. Equation 4) for ImageNet
and λ = 3 for CIFAR-10 to guarantee close to 100% attack success rate. We found that changing the
maximum number of iterations has little effect on the attack’s ability to bypass our detector, and thus
we fix to a reasonable value of 50 steps for ImageNet (which is sufficient to guarantee convergence;
see Figure 4) and 200 steps for CIFAR-10. The learning rate has a more noticeable effect and we
evaluate our detector against different chosen values. See the Supplementary Material for detection
results against variants of these attacks, including untargeted attacks and τ = 0.03.
Baselines. We compare our detector against two strategies: Feature Squeezing [56] and Artifacts
[14]. These detection algorithms are the most similar to ours — using a combination of different
criteria as features for the detector. We modify the Artifacts defense slightly to use the density and
uncertainty estimates directly by thresholding rather than training a classifier on top of these features,
which has been shown in prior work [6] to remain effective against adversaries that are agnostic to the
defense. With a false positive rates (FPR) of 0.1, Feature Squeezing attains a detection rate of 0.737
on ImageNet and 0.892 on CIFAR-10, while Artifacts attains a detection rate of 0.587 on CIFAR-10.
We adopt the same strategy as in section 4.3 to formulate white-box attacks against these detectors,
adding a term in the adversarial loss for each criterion and using Backward Pass Differentiable
Approximation (BPDA) to compute the gradient of non-differentiable transformations [1]. Details on
these modifications can be found in the Supplementary Material.
5.2 Detection results
ImageNet results. Table 1 shows the detection rate of our method against various adversaries
on ImageNet. We evaluate our detector under two different settings, resulting in FPR of 0.1 and
0.2. Entries in the table correspond to the detection rate (or true positive rate) when the white-box
adversary defined in section 4.3 is applied to attack the model along with the detector.
Under all six attack settings (PGD vs. CW, LR = 0.01, 0.03, 0.1), our detector performs substantially
better than random, achieving a worst-case detection rate of 0.49 at FPR = 0.2 and 0.264 at FPR =
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Table 2: Detection rates of different detection algorithms against white-box adversaries on CIFAR-10.
Worst-case performance against all evaluated attacks is underlined for each detector.
Detector FPR PGD CW
Feature Squeezing 0.2 0.074 0.096
Feature Squeezing 0.1 0.008 0.021
Artifacts 0.2 0.108 0.018
Artifacts 0.1 0.090 0.009
LR=0.001 LR=0.01 LR=0.1 LR=0.001 LR=0.01 LR=0.1
C1 0.2 1.000 0.991 0.792 0.422 0.033 0.012
C2t 0.2 0.024 0.050 0.346 0.098 0.786 0.971
C2u 0.2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Combined 0.2 0.998 0.984 0.660 0.374 0.481 0.740
C1 0.1 0.986 0.953 0.207 0.283 0.016 0.007
C2t 0.1 0.010 0.015 0.180 0.026 0.581 0.858
C2u 0.1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Combined 0.1 0.966 0.909 0.187 0.263 0.356 0.568
0.1 on ImageNet. This result is a considerable improvement over similar detection methods such as
Feature Squeezing, where the detection rate is close to 0, i.e. the adversarial images appear “more
real” than natural images. We emphasize that given the strong adversary that we evaluate against
(τ = 0.1), these detection rates are very difficult to attain against white-box attacks.
Ablation study. We further decompose the components of our detector to demonstrate the trade-offs
the adversary must make when attacking our detector. When using different learning rates, the
adversary switches between attempting to fool criteria C1 and C2. For example, at LR = 0.01, the
PGD adversary can be detected using criterion C1 substantially better than using criterion C2t due
to under-optimization of the value ∆. On the other hand, at LR = 0.1, the adversary succeeds in
bypassing criterion C1 at the cost of failing C2t. The criterion C2u does not appear to be effective
here as it consistently achieves a detection rate of close to 0. However, it is a crucial component of
our method against untargeted attacks (see Supplementary Material). Overall, our combined detector
achieves the best worst-case detection rate across all attack scenarios.
CIFAR-10 results. The detection rates for our method are slightly worse on CIFAR-10 (Table 2)
but still outperforming the Feature Squeezing and Artifacts baselines, which are close to 0 in the
worst case. For this dataset, criterion C2u becomes ineffective due to the over-saturation of predicted
probabilities for clean images, causing untargeted perturbation to take excessively many steps.
Furthermore, the CIFAR-10 dataset violates both of our hypotheses regarding the distribution of
adversarial perturbations near a natural image. Models trained on CIFAR-10 are much less robust
to random Gaussian noise due to lack of data augmentation and poor diversity of training samples
— the VGG-19 model could only tolerate a Gaussian noise of σ = 0.01 as opposed to σ = 0.1 for
ResNet-101 on ImageNet. Furthermore, CIFAR-10 is much lower-dimensional than ImageNet, hence
natural images are comparatively farther from the decision boundary [13, 43]. Given this observation,
we suggest that our detector be used only in situations where these two assumptions can be satisfied.
Table 3: Detection rates for variations of the gray-box ad-
versary on ImageNet. Worst-case performance against all
evaluated attacks is underlined for each detector.
Detector FPR τ = 0.03 τ = 0.1
PGD CW PGD CW
Feature Squeezing 0.05 0.669 0.304 0.572 0.014
Feature Squeezing 0.1 0.758 0.336 0.672 0.020
Ours: Combined 0.05 0.976 0.981 0.896 0.570
Ours: Combined 0.1 0.990 0.989 0.915 0.678
Gray-box detection results. Despite
the fact that our detection mechanism
is formulated against white-box adver-
saries, we evaluated against a gray-
box adversary with knowledge of the
underlying model but not of the detec-
tor for completeness.
Table 3 shows detection rates for gray-
box attacks at FPR of 0.05 and 0.1
on ImageNet. At perceptibility bound
τ = 0.03, the combined detector is
very successful at detecting the gener-
ated adversarial images, achieving a detection rate of 97.6% at 5% FPR. In comparison, Feature
Squeezing could only achieve a detection rate of 30.4% against the CW attack. Against the much
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stronger adversary at τ = 0.1, both detectors perform significantly worse, but our combined detector
still achieves a non-trivial detection rate.
5.3 Adversarial loss curves
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Figure 4: Plot of different components of the ad-
versarial loss L∗. See text for details.
To further substantiate our claim that the criteria
C1 and C2t/u are mutually exclusive, we plot the
value of different components of the adversarial
loss L∗ throughout optimization for the white-
box attack (PGD) on ImageNet. The center lines
in Figure 4 show the average loss for each Li
over 1,000 images and the shaded areas indicate
standard deviation. Since the primary goal is
to cause misclassification, the term L1 (blue
line) shows steady descending trend throughout
optimization and its value has stabilized after 50
iterations. L2 (orange line) begins at a low value
due to the initialization being a natural image
(and hence it is robust against Gaussian noise),
and after 50 iterations it returns back to the initial level, which shows that the adversary is successful
at bypassing criterion C1. However, this success comes at the cost of L3 (red line) failing to reduce
to a sufficiently low level due to inherent conflict with L2 (and L1), hence criterion C2t can be used
to detect the resulting adversarial image.
5.4 Detection times
Table 4: Running time of different components of
our detection algorithm on ImageNet and CIFAR-
10. See text for details.
Real PGD CW
ImageNet
C1 0.074s 0.091s 0.107s
C2t 0.403s 1.057s 3.46s
C2u 4.512s 0.138s 0.241s
CIFAR-10
C1 0.011s 0.013s 0.012s
C2t 0.379s 0.128s 0.27s
C2u 5.230s 0.055s 9.631s
One drawback of our method is its (relatively)
high computation cost. Criteria C2t/u require
executing a gradient-based attack until either la-
bel change or for a specified number of steps.
To limit the number of false positives, the up-
per threshold on the number of gradient steps
must be sufficiently high, dominating the run-
ning time of the detection algorithm. Table 4
shows the average per-image detection time for
both real and (targeted) adversarial images on
ImageNet and CIFAR-10. On both datasets, the
average detection time for real images is approx-
imately 5 seconds and is largely due to a large threshold for C2u. The situation is similar for
adversarial images: As the CW attack optimizes the margin loss, taking the adversarial images much
farther into the decision boundary, it takes longer (many more steps to undo via C2t/u) to detect it.
6 Conclusion
We have shown that our detection method achieves substantially improved resistance to white-box
adversaries compared to prior work. In contrast to other detection algorithms that combine multiple
criteria, the criteria used in our method are mutually exclusive — optimizing one will negatively
affect the other — yet are inherently true for natural images. While we do not suggest that our method
is impervious to white-box attacks, it does present a significant hurdle to overcome and raises the bar
for any potential adversary.
There are, however, some limitations to our method. The running time of our detector is dominated
by testing criterion C2, which involves running an iterative gradient-based attack algorithm. The high
computation cost could prohibit the suitability of our detector for deployment. Furthermore, it is
fair to say that the false positive rate remains relatively high due to a large variance in the statistics
∆, Kt and Ku for the different criteria, hence a threshold-based test cannot completely separate
real and adversarial inputs. Future research that improve in either front can certainly ameliorate the
performance of our method to be more practical in real world systems.
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Supplementary Material: A New Defense Against Adversarial
Images: Turning a Weakness into a Strength
A Additional Experiments
A.1 Detection rates on Inception network
Table 5 shows detection rates on ImageNet using a Inception-v3 model [48] by criteria C1, C2t, and
C2u individually and jointly. We observe an almost identical trend as using ResNet-101 as the target
model (Table 1 in main paper): the adversary cannot simultaneously fool both criteria C1 and C2t.
Detection rates by Feature Squeezing are slightly higher than those for ResNet-101 but remain close
to 0 and are substantially worse than those by our combined detector.
Table 5: Detection rates for different detection algorithms against white-box adversaries on ImageNet
with Inception-v3 target model. Worst-case performance against all evaluated attacks is underlined
for each detector.
Detector FPR PGD CW
Feature Squeezing 0.2 0.068 0.031
Feature Squeezing 0.1 0.062 0.013
LR=0.01 LR=0.03 LR=0.1 LR=0.01 LR=0.03 LR=0.1
C1 0.2 0.858 0.712 0.628 0.803 0.483 0.362
C2t 0.2 0.173 0.411 0.424 0.449 0.585 0.543
C2u 0.2 0.004 0.013 0.003 0.346 0.225 0.067
Combined 0.2 0.762 0.546 0.468 0.788 0.527 0.479
C1 0.1 0.648 0.36 0.258 0.688 0.29 0.142
C2t 0.1 0.043 0.157 0.18 0.231 0.322 0.321
C2u 0.1 0.001 0.006 0.003 0.255 0.114 0.056
Combined 0.1 0.516 0.257 0.203 0.635 0.281 0.199
Table 6: Detection rates for variations of the white-box adversary. Worst-case performance against
all evaluated attacks is underlined for each detector.
Detector FPR PGD CW
LR=0.01 LR=0.03 LR=0.1 LR=0.01 LR=0.03 LR=0.1
Small radius (τ = 0.03) 0.2 0.715 0.674 0.571 0.934 0.86 0.713
Small radius (τ = 0.03) 0.1 0.583 0.522 0.418 0.894 0.753 0.500
L∗ = L1 + L2 0.2 0.695 0.765 0.800 0.738 0.604 0.512
L∗ = L1 + L2 0.1 0.527 0.572 0.632 0.58 0.353 0.304
Untargeted Attack 0.2 0.994 0.997 0.997 0.538 0.567 0.576
Untargeted Attack 0.1 0.987 0.995 0.995 0.395 0.342 0.378
A.2 Variations of the white-box attack
We further analyze our detection method in three different attack scenarios: Using a smaller percepti-
bility threshold τ = 0.03, attacking criterion C1 only, and performing untargeted attack. The second
variation is of interest since the losses L3 and L4 are in direct conflict with L2 (and L1), possibly
hindering optimization.
Table 6 shows detection rates for the combined detector using criteria C1 and C2 against these attack
variations on ResNet-101. First, as expected, we see that the small radius attack (τ = 0.03 at the
top two rows) is substantially easier to detect than the one with τ = 0.1. When evaluated against
the attack that only targets C1 (middle two rows) and against untargeted attack (last two rows), our
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method remains effective and the worst-case detection rate is higher than that for the targeted attack
in section 5.2. These experimental observations suggest that the white-box adversary we evaluate
against in section 5.2 could be the optimal first-order attack algorithm against our detector and
confirms that our evaluation protocol is sound.
A.3 Backpropagation through the gradients
Table 7: Detection rates of our combined
method against white-box adversaries us-
ing backpropagation through the gradi-
ents on ImageNet.
LR FPR PGD CW
0.01 0.2 0.536 0.587
0.03 0.2 0.652 0.794
0.10 0.2 0.710 0.817
0.01 0.1 0.288 0.337
0.03 0.1 0.411 0.593
0.10 0.1 0.493 0.692
In the section 4.3, we obtain the gradients of L3 and L4
for white-box attack using Backward Pass Differentiable
Approximation (BPDA) [1]. Here, we investigate back-
propagation through the gradients to obtain the gradients,
an approach commonly used in second order methods [15].
The results on ImageNet are reported in Table 7. The de-
tection rates are similar to those of using BPDA (Table 1,
combined) in section 5.2 except that CW attack at LR =
0.01 becomes stronger. The attack time is significantly
longer: on average 31 sec/image compared to 14 sec/image
by BPDA.
A.4 Comparison to adversarial training
We compare to adversarial training [33], which aims to directly learn a target model that is robust
to adversaries. We note that [33] reports recognition accuracy rather than detection rates. Besides,
our results (on CIFAR) are based on an L∞ perturbation norm bound of 0.1, which is much larger
than the bound of 0.03 used in [33] and makes detection much harder. To better compare against
their work, we examine with the adversarially trained model that has a 87.3% accuracy on natural
images while the undefended model has 95.3%, which is close to the 10% FPR setting we use in our
experiments. We also evaluate our detector against the L∞-bound of 0.03. Under the strongest PGD
attack, our approach has a detection rate of 84.0% (50-step PGD, LR = 0.1) while the adversarially
trained model has a recognition accuracy of 45.8% (20-step PGD) on adversarial images.
A.5 Boundary attack
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Figure 5: Detection rates against boundary attack
at different steps of attacks on ImageNet.
To evaluate our detector against gradient-free
adversaries, we experiment with boundary at-
tack [4] for attacking the target model and de-
tection mechanism as a black box. We restrict
the mean squared error (MSE) of the adversar-
ial perturbation to be less than 0.01, which is
comparable to an L∞ bound of 0.1. We evalu-
ate the attack in three scenarios: attacking cri-
terion C1 alone, criteria C1+C2t, and criteria
C1+C2t+C2u. Here a successful adversary is an
image which not only fools the detector but also
has MSE less than 0.01; otherwise, we consider
this adversary to be detected. We plot the de-
tection rate curve on ImageNet in Figure 5. We
observe a similar trend against gradient-based adversaries ( Table 1 of the main text): the criterion
C1 alone is insufficient for detection, while adding the criterion C2 greatly increase the difficulty of
attack. When the detection criteria is C1+C2t+C2u, the mutual exclusivity of these criteria prohibits
optimization progress of the boundary attack.
B Implementation Details
B.1 Hyperparameter settings for detector
Our detection algorithm requires the following hyperparameters:
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Criterion 1. We set the variance parameter σ such that predictions on real images are minimally
affected after random perturbation. This quantity is set to σ = 0.1 on ImageNet and σ = 0.01 on
CIFAR-10.
Criterion 2. Hyperparameters for criterion C2t (number of steps to a chosen target class) consist of
all hyperparameters in the attack algorithm A, including step size, maximum number of steps, and
perceptibility threshold τA. On ImageNet, we chose a step size of 0.005, allow a maximum of 200
steps, and set τA = 0.03. This setting guarantees that most real images will be successfully perturbed
to cross the decision boundary. The hyperparameters for C2u are different due to over-saturation of
predicted probabilities. Thus, we chose a step size of 0.2 and allow a maximum of 1,000 steps. The
perceptibility threshold remains at τA = 0.03. Hyperparameters for Inception-v3 and for VGG-19 on
CIFAR-10 are set similarly but are adapted to the particular model and dataset.
B.2 Details for white-box attack against baselines
In this section we give details for the white-box attack used against Feature Squeezing and Artifacts.
Feature Squeezing applies three different transformations — median smoothing, bit quantization,
and non-local mean — to the input and measures the L1 distance in predicted probability before
and after transformation. We modify the white-box attack to bypass this defense as follows. Let
F1, F2, F3 denote the three transformations. The modified (PGD) adversarial loss is defined as
L?FS = cross-entropy(h(x′), yt) +
3∑
i=1
[‖h(x′)− h(Fi(x′))‖1] .
Gradients of non-differentiable transformations, namely bit quantization and non-local mean, are
approximated using BPDA [1].
Artifacts uses empirical measures of density in feature space and model uncertainty estimated using
dropout to characterize adversarial examples. To bypass this defense, we can alter the adversarial
loss to maximize density and minimize uncertainty while causing misclassification.
Density is computed via kernel density estimation in feature space with a Gaussian kernel. This
quantity, say φ(x), is differentiable and can be directly optimized via gradient descent. On the
other hand, minimizing uncertainty can be achieved by computing the empirical variance via Monte
Carlo sampling. More specifically, let hb be the classification model with dropout mask b ∼
Bernoulli(0.5)m, where m is the number of model parameters. Each iteration, we sample N = 50
dropout masks bi and compute pi = hbi(x) for i = 1, . . . , N . Let µ(x) and Σ(x) be the empirical
mean and variance of the sample of probability vectors p1, . . . ,pN . We can then minimize the trace
of Σ(x) to reduce variance.
The complete adversarial loss is given by
L?Art = cross-entropy(h(x′), yt)− φ(x′) + tr(Σ(x′)).
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